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Abstract 
Most accounts of business coordination assume historically given conditions for this to 
emerge. Business coordination is therefore difficult, perhaps impossible, to construct 
endogenously. This paper examines a process of ‘endogenous coordination’ through an 
analysis of reindustrialization and industrial upgrading in Central Europe during the 2000s. 
Because of its recent post-communist history, during which existing institutions of economic 
governance were dismantled wholesale, Central Europe is a particularly unlikely place for 
complex forms of business coordination to emerge. Demonstrating the empirical possibility of 
endogenous coordination, and identifying conditions under which it has emerged thus shifts 
the debate from pessimistic fatalism to a more optimistic world of possibility. The paper 
identifies three conditions for business coordination to emerge. One, a pattern of 
industrialization that combines sophisticated skills and capital goods, leading to higher asset 
specificity and fixed costs; two, bottlenecks in the production of collective goods associated 
with these assets against the background of potentially high returns in investment; and, three, 
the existence of a third party, which provides a forum for deliberation and strategic 
coordination while holding effective sanctioning capacity. 
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1
Endogenous Coordination 
Multinational Companies and the 
Production of Collective Goods in 
Central and Eastern Europe 
 
The comparative study of capitalism has, since the publication of the Varieties 
of Capitalism volume (Hall and Soskice 2001), directed attention to market 
and strategic coordination as the critical variables that differentiate (as ideal-
types) liberal and coordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs) – and 
beyond. Business coordination can help understand how France adjusted 
(Hancké 2002) after failing to reinvent itself along CME lines (Culpepper 
2001). It is a useful perspective to make sense of the development of Latin 
American political economies (Ross-Schneider and Soskice 2009), and of the 
economic organization of Mediterranean countries (Molina & Rhodes 2007). 
And in its ‘negative’ version, lamenting the absence of domestic business 
coordination, including some of its proto-institutional forms such as high 
trust or social capital (Stiglitz 1999; Levy 1999), as a condition for economic 
upgrading, business coordination is an equally crucial variable in 
understanding divergent outcomes. All these views share the underlying idea 
that business coordination is exogenously given, usually handed down 
through history, or – conversely – destroyed under particular historical 
conditions. Hall and Soskice (2001) are relatively silent on the origins of 
coordination, and whilst Hancké et al. (2007) explore these to some extent, 
they ultimately conclude in favour of the historical hypothesis. The argument 
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in Feldmann (2007) is more dynamic: transition policies in Estonia had a 
network-destroying and in Slovenia a network-preserving effect, two 
pathways that he causally relates to the absence or presence of business 
coordination in these countries. Yet his analysis also underscores the 
importance of historical junctures and irreversibilities in the process.  
There is little doubt that business coordinating capacity is a relatively scarce 
semi-institutional good: without this assumption the failure of reform in 
France, the inability of Spain to upgrade its manufacturing industry, and the 
thin institutional pathways that Central Europe has adopted since that period, 
would all be difficult to understand. But this historically deterministic 
perspective on the roots of business coordination has unfortunate 
implications: in the limiting instance, business coordination becomes, for 
those who think of it as a worthwhile asset, a bit like a rich uncle – nice to 
have, but there is not much you can do about it if you do not (cf. Levy 1999). If 
a political economy missed the rendez-vous with business coordination at a 
critical juncture, or destroyed existing or incipient forms of business 
coordination for whatever reason, it seems to have lost this chance forever. As 
a result of these obstacles to building business coordinating capacity 
endogenously, nations are thus likely to drift from low and medium levels of 
strategic coordination into a position approximating pure market 
coordination. Since deregulating an institutional framework that supports 
business coordination is considerably easier than building it, political-
economic adjustment will follow a neo-liberal path by default when faced 
with inconsistent and often underperforming institutions (Hall & Gingerich 
2009) – true in continental Western Europe, but possibly even more so in 
Central Europe, where nominally neo-liberal policies forced these new 
capitalist nations onto a path of rapid market-making without the 
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concomitant (welfare-)state making that historically accompanied such 
transitions in the post-war period (Innes 2010).  
This paper addresses this problem of what I call ‘endogenous coordination’ 
through an analysis of reindustrialization and industrial upgrading in Central 
Europe, and the conditions under which inter-firm strategic coordination 
emerged in certain geographic areas and industrial sectors that supported 
these processes. While the ambition of this paper may appear modest, its 
implications are potentially wide-ranging. If building business coordination 
capacity endogenously is as difficult as it appears, then demonstrating the 
empirical possibility of endogenous coordination, and identifying conditions 
under which it has emerged, shifts the debate from pessimistic fatalism to a 
more optimistic world of possibility. This is particularly the case in Central 
Europe in the 2000s, an area not known as a fertile breeding ground for such 
complex institutional arrangements. My main empirical focus is on the 
complex engineering sector in Central Europe – the regional economy that 
encompasses most of the Czech Republic, south-west Poland, western 
Slovakia and north-western Hungary, and which is dominated by large 
foreign multinational companies (MNCs). The rapid and massive 
reindustrialization of these highly FDI-dependent, neo-capitalist political 
economies offers a laboratory to study the emergence of potentially different 
forms of capitalism and market organization (see also Nölke & Vliegenthart 
2009). It thus also allows us to compare different forms of emergent market 
and strategic coordination. The paper identifies instances of inter-firm 
coordination of the type that Hall and Soskice (2001) address as ‘strategic’ (i.e. 
not primarily based on market relations), and analytically examines the 
conditions under which they emerged. Since these forms of strategic 
coordination came into existence in institutional environments which had 
historically been ‘thin’, and in regions and countries where states and private 
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associations were weak but foreign MNCs very strong, I call the emergent 
form of coordination ‘endogenous’ since it is neither primarily given by 
history, nor imposed from the outside, but resulted from the interactions 
between the actors themselves – although not without a partial transfer of 
sovereignty to a third party. The main purpose of this paper is to retrace and 
analyze the conditions under which such endogenous forms of business 
coordination have occurred.  
Methodologically, the project of this paper can therefore be considered as the 
equivalent of finding one sign of life in outer space: I make no claims about 
generalizability, deep trends toward coordination in Central Europe, or even 
that such endogenous forms of coordination are necessarily sustainable 
arrangements in the long run (though I do think that they are both more 
common and more stable than many believe, at least until the onset of the 
crisis of 2007-09). However, just as one signal emanating from intelligent 
beings beyond the Earth would offer proof that we are not alone in the 
universe, so even only a handful of instances suggests that there is room for 
business coordination to emerge beyond historically present conditions.  
The first part of this paper explores the literature that analyzed the emergence 
of business coordination, and assesses its usefulness for understanding 
developments in Central Europe (CEE). In the second section, I analyze the 
profiles of re-industrialization in different CEE economies since the mid-
1990s, distilling two broad economic development patterns, each with very 
different strategic implications for firms in those economies. Since these 
patterns of ‘complex’ versus ‘basic’ industrialization result in different levels 
of asset specificity and therefore of fixed costs, thus section 3, they present 
both labour and especially capital, with very different time horizons. When 
faced with bottlenecks in the production of collective goods such as skills and 
regional technological capacity, firms therefore run into classic collective 
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action problems. These problems – the final step in the argument – are 
resolved through non-firm actors who provide forums for deliberation and 
strategic coordination against the background of sanctioning capacity. 
Throughout this analytical narrative, relevant comparisons with situations 
where these conditions are not met, will highlight the salience of each of the 
conditions I identify.  
 
1. The role and origins of business coordination  
Business coordination appears to be a necessary (though not necessarily a 
sufficient) condition for collective competition goods such as industry-specific 
skills and sophisticated technological capabilities (see Crouch et al. 2001) to 
emerge. The problem is perhaps best understood as a simple collective action 
problem. Companies A and B would both be better off if the collective 
competition good existed (technology transfer, for example, or a specific skill 
formation system that would produce skilled workers for both A and B). 
However, since A benefits from not contributing to but consuming the 
collective good that B has produced and vice versa, neither of the two (and, 
by extension, more) companies will initiate the production of the collective 
good in the first place, and all are worse off. Business coordination overcomes 
this collective action problem by (a) providing a deliberative arrangement in 
which firms no longer meet as atomized agents, but as organized members 
and (b) rewarding contribution or punishing free-riding (Finegold & Soskice 
1988; Hall & Soskice 2001). Business coordination is therefore a valuable semi-
institutional asset for countries embarking on a development path aimed at 
producing high value-added, medium-high technology goods and services. 
Most of the companies in those countries will be of the A and B type above; 
yet since they compete, they will be reluctant to share in the production of 
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what might become specific strategic assets. The likely result is therefore that, 
if left without some form of non-market coordination, such arrangements fail 
to produce the necessary collective goods. 
 Our understanding of the emergence and sustainability of business 
coordination falls broadly into two categories. The first, and numerically the 
dominant perspective, in essence answers the question historically. At some 
point in the recent or distant past, a set of preconditions existed leading to the 
production of institutional arrangements that furthered the emergence of 
inter-firm coordination. This could be the mode of work organization in the 
pre-capitalist era (Iversen & Soskice 2009), the nature of the political system 
(Martin and Swank 2011), the emergence of large banks or the state as the 
social matrix of capital, or closer in time, the policies adopted by governments 
during the post-1989 transition in Central Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union which could have preserved the key elements of proto-coordination or 
destroyed them (Feldmann 2007; King 2007; Stiglitz 1999). And where 
business coordination was existent but underdeveloped, it either disappeared, 
as under Thatcher’s UK (Wood 2001), or was complemented by strategic 
actions by the state, as in France and other Latin European economies (Molina 
& Rhodes 2007).  
The second view of coordination does not necessarily reject this historical 
hypothesis, but suggests that it is not a necessary condition for some form of 
governing institutional arrangements to emerge. In a market economy, thus 
the argument by, among others, Hayek (1967, esp. chapters 4 and 6), free 
actors will develop exactly the number and type of institutions that they deem 
necessary to govern the contracts they engage in. Since any dyad can in 
principle produce a different institutional arrangement to govern its 
contracting, society (societies) will produce multiple institutional orders; 
according to Hayek competition between these different institutional models 
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will weed out the inefficient ones. Institutions are, therefore, intrinsically 
endogenous as a result of the combined effects of experimentation and 
competition.  
A related though different, constructivist version of this argument can be 
found in Sabel’s writings on economic governance of industrial adjustment 
(Sabel 1991 and 1995; Cohen 2010). This perspective posits ‘studied trust’ and 
monitoring of benchmarks as the key mechanisms: any interaction between 
two parties requires some form of trust (the expectation that B will not renege 
on its commitment once A has dedicated resources to a joint project), upon 
which the parties can build toward ever more complex arrangements. After 
all, trust is, as Arrow (1974) already pointed out, a good that increases in 
value with use. Monitoring, in turn, refers to the process of agreeing on 
principles and outcomes without specifying how each actor reaches those. 
Combined, thus the argument, they offer a mechanism that actors will accept, 
but which also has the effect of raising cooperation from a basic to a more 
complex level.  
These views help us considerably in understanding the emergence of 
coordination, since they address complementary processes. History obviously 
matters for the production of coordination. Without the necessary insurance 
mechanisms in the political economy, it would be hard to imagine actors 
suspending their critical sense and engaging in wildcat cooperation. 
Coordination and cooperation is considerably easier to sustain in a 
sociological world in which reputations and redistributive mechanisms are 
supported by pre-existing institutions. Or, put differently, any attempt at 
voluntary mutually beneficial coordination, such as a price-fixing cartel, is 
very hard to sustain if the prospective benefits of any individual party 
adhering to the rules of the cartel are lower than the benefits gained by 
temporarily exiting the cartel. If OPEC constrains its oil production to drive 
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up the price, for example, then any individual OPEC member faces a steep 
incentive to over-produce to reap the short-term gains in revenue. Two 
mechanisms stop this from happening: exclusion from the club as a sanction, 
and/or reputational damage – yet both require some form of pre-existing 
sanctioning capacity or social matrix that would enforce these mechanisms 
(Aoki 2001; 2005). History, thus the argument, provides precisely that.  
But that leaves us with a puzzle that cannot be understood within the 
framework of the historical hypothesis on the emergence of business 
coordination. Empirically, the transition to democratic capitalism in Central 
Europe took place against a background of the systematic destruction of the 
pre-1989 autocratic planned economy, and in its wake of most economic as 
well as non-economic institutions that existed before 1989. Countries in CEE 
thus entered the post-socialist era with very ‘thin’ institutions and without a 
relevant recent history to build on. At the same time, however, companies in 
CEE appear to have built embryonic forms of coordination, even in regions 
and countries where a priori that possibility was only marginal at best (i.e. not 
in places like Slovenia, where the preconditions for business coordination 
were carried over from the past – cf. Feldmann 2007). Hayek’s (1967) 
argument on how institutions evolve endogenously is in part helpful here: if 
two parties consider cooperation to be mutually beneficial, they will adopt the 
common rules necessary to govern that cooperation. That point, however, 
encounters its limits in the simple problem that what may be mutually 
beneficial is not always produced (Olson 1966), even in small groups, as the 
standard Prisoner’s Dilemma makes clear. All else equal, market failures are 
the standard outcomes of cooperative ventures of this kind: neither A nor B is 
willing to commit resources to a cooperative venture in the absence of 
binding promises of the other to do the same. The problem could be overcome 
through the adoption of ‘thick’ deliberative and sanctioning institutions: 
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deliberation would allow actors to understand, even in one-shot games, how 
their collective goal can be furthered, and sanctioning capacity is necessary to 
incentivize all the potential beneficiaries of the collective good to contribute to 
its production. But that takes us far from the parsimonious ‘endogenous 
institutions’ of the Hayekian universe, and back into the historical 
perspective. The constructivist endogenous view, in turn, simply assumes too 
much of the relevant actors, and is probably not falsifiable in any instance. 
The emergence of coordination in CEE followed, as discussed below, a 
dramatic breakdown in trust as a result of highly opportunistic actions that 
undermined the endogenous capacity for future cooperation. It is unclear 
where, under those circumstances, trust would reside; and ‘discovering’ such 
trust post hoc simply is not sufficient as an argument, since it cannot 
distinguish between situations where it should have emerged and did on the 
one hand, and type I and type II errors on the other – situations where trust 
should have emerged but did not and where trust should not have emerged 
but did.  
In their original statements neither the historical nor the endogenous views of 
institutions therefore help us understand the unexpected outcome in CEE, 
where companies appear to have built inter-firm coordination. The 
(inductive) argument I put forward here is that under certain restrictive 
conditions, which all appear simultaneously necessary in an expansive 
reading, coordination between firms can emerge, even in the absence of 
historical and/or institutional preconditions. These conditions can be 
summarized as follows. The first is high fixed costs: if actors – firms in this 
case – have a sufficiently long time horizon in the amortization of their 
investment, they are locked into the situation from which they started out 
without viable exit options. The second is a high level of asset specificity, both 
on the side of firms and workers, as a result of which the asset cannot easily 
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be contracted in (and thus has to be produced). The third is the existence of 
bottlenecks in the production and provision of the good against the 
background of large future rewards resulting from high growth. And the 
fourth and final introduces an important political moment: the presence of a 
third party offering a deliberative setting for the discussion of cooperation 
and capable of adequately sanctioning deviations from the cooperation 
pattern. This third party in effect plays the role of a coordinating agent, but is 
backed up, as we shall see, by the fact that it provides a separate public good 
to firms and thus in principle is capable of sanctioning them. The balance of 
this paper is organized in three sections, each one developing in conceptual 
and empirical detail the steps above. The sections are organized along simple 
narratives, but will bring in relevant comparisons with other situations, both 
within CEE and in the rest of Europe, to highlight the ‘necessary’ character of 
the conditions outlined earlier. The final section concludes.  
 
2. High fixed costs: Leading sectors and comparative 
institutional advantage 
The post-1989 reindustrialization of Central Europe is in essence a story of the 
crucial role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in economic development 
(Greskovits 2005; Nölke & Vliegenthart 2009). Foreign capital, as the history 
of recent industrializations in other parts of the world such as Latin America 
and Southern Europe suggests, can produce very different outcomes, ranging 
from relatively benign local developmental effects to uncontrollable private 
forces in newly industrializing areas in order to exploit significant (wage) cost 
advantages. Central Europe initially was no exception. Even though before 
the late 1980s some market-seeking logic may have been at the basis of 
activity of MNCs in Central Europe, there is little doubt that the post-1989 
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investments were primarily guided by the low wage, tax and other cost 
advantages of the region relative to Western Europe. Large MNCs that 
located in CEE bring with them a significant amount of autonomy: their 
weight relative to the local and national economies where they settled 
allowed them to negotiate from a position of strength with local and national 
authorities, their financial autonomy allowed them to internalize costs as well 
as benefits, and their long-term links with subcontractors in the West allowed 
them to build a state-of-the-art supplier network. Multinational companies, 
furthermore, can cross-subsidize a few years of losses in new operations if 
they assume that strategic gains lie further down the road.  
 
Table 1. A typology of leading sectors 
 
‘Complex’ sectors 
 Light-complex: only human capital intensive: e.g. pharmaceuticals, office and data 
processing machines, electrical machinery, scientific equipment, optical goods, 
clocks 
 Heavy-complex: intensive in both physical and human capital intensive: e.g. 
chemicals, machinery and equipment, road vehicles and transport equipment 
 
 
‘Basic’ sectors 
 Light-basic: intensive neither in physical nor human capital, but unskilled labour: 
e.g. cork and wood, textile, rubber, furniture manufacturing, clothing and accessories 
and footwear 
 Heavy-basic: intensive only in physical capital: e.g. food, live animals, beverages and 
tobacco, fuels, vegetable oils, iron and steel, pulp and paper, non-ferrous metals 
 
Source: Greskovits 2005 
 
 
A careful comparison of foreign investment in and export profiles of different 
CEE member-states, based on the asset-specificity typology that Greskovits 
(2005) has constructed, suggests quite convincingly that broadly speaking two 
very different production profiles, related to different leading sectors, have 
emerged in the region over the last 10-15 years. Leading sectors are categories 
of firms that ‘share factor-intensity, product character and contribute 
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[significantly] to exports’ (Greskovits 2005: 2). The typology is essentially 
based on the degree to which industries are labour or capital-intensive, and, 
dichotomizing the positions for both factors of production, leads to four sub-
types which are summarized in table 1: a) intensive only in physical capital, b) 
intensive in both physical and human capital, c) only in human capital, and d) 
in neither physical nor human capital, but unskilled labor. In the following, 
these factor-combinations are referred to as a) heavy-basic, b) heavy-complex, 
c) light-complex, and d) light-basic profiles (Greskovits, 2005; Bohle & 
Greskovits 2007). For the purposes of this analysis, these four can be collapsed 
into two very different production profiles: the ‘complex’ sectors relying on 
relatively complex technologies and sophisticated skills, and ‘basic’ sectors 
which do considerably less so.  
 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE, 2007. Own calculations.  
 
Using this typology as a perspective to look at reindustrialization and 
investment in Central Europe in particular shows a remarkable differentiation 
across the region. As figure 1 demonstrates, Slovenia and the Viségrad 4 
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Figure 1. The evolution of leading sectors in Central Europe 
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countries (Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia – V4 henceforth) 
have increasingly specialized in complex export industries, while in the others 
(the Baltic states and south-eastern Europe) heavy-basic and light-basic 
profiles dominate. In the V4 and Slovenia at least 40% of their exports – and 
usually considerably more – over the last decade consisted of complex goods; 
40% appears to have become the ceiling for complex product exports in the 
remaining countries. In addition, the trajectories of the V4 and Slovenia 
contrast sharply with the Baltics and South-eastern Europe (SEE). In the first 
group, the share of complex products in exports rises almost immediately 
after the transition recession of the early 1990s, while that share first fell in the 
other group and began to rise only toward the end of the decade, and then 
only slowly. While it may be too early to treat these different outcomes as 
stable, there are reasons to believe that it is very difficult for the Baltics and 
SEE to catch up with the V4 in terms of the importance of complex 
manufacturing. The initial wave of investment in CEE seems to have 
produced significant positive network externalities: complex manufacturing is 
likely to locate where other companies with a similar profile are already 
located because they can draw on existing collective competition goods. The 
western parts of Central Europe are now the new industrial heartland for 
medium-tech complex goods, such as cars and light engineering. The region 
produces more cars per capita than anywhere else in Europe and possibly the 
world, and a sophisticated supplier network has emerged, particularly in the 
centrally located Czech Republic.  
The upshot of this comparison of reindustrialization in Central and Eastern 
Europe is therefore that the countries that specialized in complex exports 
developed a very different profile from the others, with significant 
implications in terms of their ‘rootedness’ in the areas where they are located. 
Complex engineering typically takes place in large plants: the automobile 
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industry and its suppliers may be the typical examples of this, but chemical 
and pharmaceutical companies, as well as light sophisticated engineering 
require huge up-front investments in capital and, to a lesser extent, skills – or, 
in this case, the presence of specific skills associated with that type of 
manufacturing at least precludes a rapid exit when the environment turns 
more hostile. This combination of a reliance on specific skills and capital is 
absent in the Baltic states and South-eastern Europe, where at least one of the 
factors is of a ‘generic’ nature, and exit options are therefore, ceteris paribus, 
higher in the latter than in the V4 countries which rely on complex 
manufacturing. Steel plants, one could argue, are just as ‘rooted’ in their 
environment as, for example, car plants. Yet steel plants can in fact relatively 
easily relocate, both within and beyond CEE, since they rely less on skilled 
workers and, perhaps most importantly, owners can quite easily shift 
production capacity to more modern plants elsewhere if that appears to be 
more beneficial. Textile plants and other small units of light manufacturing 
are, as a result of their different capital and skill requirements, very easy to 
move in comparison with car and chemical plants. In sum, the different 
‘leading sector’ profiles that emerged in the reindustrialization of the region 
thus presented companies on the whole with long-term versus short-term 
time horizons. In complex industries, they are forced to stay; in industries 
with a basic profile they are considerably more footloose.  
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3. Asset specificity and bottlenecks: From low-wage 
location to high value-added manufacturing 
The second condition for coordination beside the low exit options concerns 
the provision – or perhaps more accurately the lack – of skills during the 
transition to capitalism. Most (possibly all) multinationals settled in the region 
in search of low labour costs – in the early 90s, wages in Central Europe were 
considerably below wage levels in the West, even controlling for lower labour 
productivity in CEE. Moreover, many companies were aware of the relatively 
high-skill levels: even though the pre-1989 production and productivity 
statistics turned out to be deeply misleading, and Central Europe was not 
quite the industrial powerhouse that many westerners had thought for 
several decades, training systems in many Central European countries often 
were adopted during the Habsburg period and therefore resembled the 
powerful, robust (west-) German training system. In addition, many 
governments made an effort, in an attempt to rapidly reindustrialize, to 
attract foreign capital through privatizations and especially tax holidays and 
subsidies (often supported by the EU’s PHARE programme). Add to this the 
high unemployment rates, which made recruitment of skilled labour a 
relatively easy task, and produced a relatively docile workforce happy to 
have a job at all in the rapidly unraveling Central-European labour market, 
and there is little doubt that the multinationals’ motivations may have been 
severely skewed toward low costs. This location strategy of MNCs was 
reflected in the initial low Relative Unit Values (RUV) of the products they 
produced.1 Taking the case of the automotive sector, Central Europe started 
                                                        
1 The formula to calculate the RUV is: (Total value of exports in sector A for region X/total volume 
in units of exports in sector A for region X) / (Total value of EU exports in sector A/total volume 
in units of EU exports in sector A). RUV is a proxy to measure the degree of sophistication and 
value of the exported products, correcting for the endogenous developments within and 
cyclicality of the industry as a whole.  
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at a RUV level that was less than one-fifth of the EU average in the early 
1990s, and in the car industry specifically only about a quarter of the unit 
value relative to production in Spain and Portugal (Scepanovic 2009).  
By the year 2000, however, many of the multinationals, especially in the 
motor vehicle and related industries, started shifting their production profile 
away from the relatively low-end, low value-added cars that they had been 
making up until then toward the high mid-end first, and high-end cars and 
car parts afterwards. The VW Group was the front-runner: by 2000, 
production in Škoda moved up from the low-tech Favorit to the sophisticated 
Octavia and Fabia, with more R&D autonomy for the years to come. 
Similarly, the VW factory in Bratislava shifted production from the entry-level 
VW Polo to the high-end sport utility vehicles (SUV) variably known as Audi 
Q7, VW Touareg or Porsche Cayenne; and the Audi engine production site in 
the Hungarian Györ has become one of the world’s leading engine producers 
(Janovskaia, 2007). At about the same time, sophisticated multinational 
complex systems suppliers such as Bosch, Valeo, VDO, and Delphi entered 
the region: by 2007, the Czech Republic was home to around 200 of them. 
Several of these – such as Siemens, VDO and TRW – set up R&D centers in the 
country (Janovskaia 2007). Overall, as Scepanovic (2009) suggests, the RUV of 
the car industry in CEE converged on and by 2002 slightly surpassed that of 
the Iberian peninsula.2  
                                                        
2 It is too early to tell exactly why the V4 appear able to avoid the low-value added path in which 
southern Europe seems to be caught. One of the difficulties for such an analytical exercise is that 
the key elements were very similar in both regions: low wages, a rapid transition, attraction of 
FDI through targeted government policies, and relatively weak labour unions. In fact, from a 
slightly broader political-economic perspective, conditions for an upward product market shift 
were possibly better in the Iberian peninsula: some recent acquaintance with capitalism (as 
opposed to a planned economy), a rapid expansion of government into the economy after 1975 
and a more active stance with regard to supply-side policies afterwards (Boix, 1998; W.R. Smith, 
1998), and trade unions who had been associated with opposition to the dictatorships instead of 
(with the exception of Poland) the transmission belts that unions often were in CEE.  
 
Bob Hancké 
 
17   
The effects of this slow but unmistakable upgrading process in the car 
industry specifically and in complex industries in general in the V4 have been 
important. Upgrading has several components that have to move in tandem 
in order for them to have the desired effect: skills need to be redefined and 
their acquisition organized, technology upgraded, supplier networks need to 
move, and infrastructure needs to be upgraded. While some of these 
processes are well within the control of the upgrading companies (especially 
capital investment), supplier links and infrastructure are less so. But the most 
interesting area is possibly in skills. After 1989, the previously existing firm-
based training systems essentially collapsed, since existing firms that trained 
went bankrupt and privatized firms stopped training against the background 
of high unemployment rates, even in the well-performing regions, which 
assured them with a supply of skilled labour. Public investment in education 
was extremely low for at least a decade after 1989, and primarily directed 
toward the acquisition of general skills rather than the complex specific ones 
that prevailed in the industry. Finally, the temporary emigration of a large 
section of the relevant younger cohorts, and the massive entry of large fast-
growing foreign companies that soak up labour have turned a region which 
started the transition in the early 1990s with an abundance of skilled workers 
into a region with significant skills shortages by the early 2000s. The rapid 
and large-scale process of upgrading thus produced strategic bottlenecks in 
specific assets such as skills, which could not easily be resolved through a 
combination of public policies and deep (private and public) pockets.  
The relevance of these particular bottlenecks is brought out clearly in a 
comparison with the upgrading process of French industry in the 1980s and 
early 1990s. The productivity crisis that France faced after the manifestation of 
the crisis of its economic model in the first half of the 1980s led to very similar 
bottlenecks: both skill formation systems and supplier links were weak, and 
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endangered the ability of large firms to modernize their production processes 
and, on the back of that, their product market strategies (Hancké 2002: 57-82). 
Yet the background conditions were very different for French firms. First of 
all, they could rely on a vast array of state policies that supported them; in 
fact, large firms in France simply hijacked government policies in areas such 
as labour relations and regional development to build robust skill formation 
and technology transfer systems. In addition, and the most important 
characteristic in comparison with Central Europe, the skills and capabilities 
that French firms required of their workers and suppliers were considerably 
more generic: upgrading in France in the period between 1985 and 1995, the 
peak period of industrial adjustment, involved a modernization of the 
existing mass-production model into a more flexible one that relied on tight 
control of development at the center and standardized off-the-shelf skills and 
parts. The public educational system produced large numbers of post-
secondary ‘technical’ workers (Courtois 1995; Dubar 1996: 63-73), and 
suppliers were organized in tight networks around the large firms, producing 
according to specifications designed in the center without much direct 
reliance on the abilities that suppliers may have acquired (Hancké 1998). 
France thus never faced the type of asset shortages that companies in the V4 
faced, which had its roots in the need for more specific skills and 
technological links. These strategic bottlenecks around asset specificity and 
the interesting and surprising solutions to the problems associated with them 
are the topic of the next section.  
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4. Emerging forms of inter-firm coordination 
Multinational companies in the Viségrad 4 countries are, as we saw, very 
different from their counterparts in the other Central European states. Foreign 
direct investment in the region had a high degree of asset-specificity, and 
much of the investment in complex production incurred high fixed costs. A 
plant in the automotive, chemical, or steel industries is highly capital-
intensive, and often requires a relatively long (>10-15 year) period for the 
investment to be written off. Precisely because such investments can only be 
realized over the medium to long run, these companies are unlikely to rapidly 
relocate in new lower-cost jurisdictions, since that would mean foregoing the 
gains from the initial investment. In sum, the V4 and to some extent Slovenia 
thus seem to have attracted long-term, ‘rooted’ FDI which brings better jobs 
and pushes economies upwards, while the others appear to have attracted 
companies with a much more foot-loose capital structure and relatively short-
term amortization periods, which allow them to relocate rapidly without 
incurring tremendous costs as a result of non-realized investment. 
Companies may initially have decided to invest in Central Europe because of 
low labour costs, but around the turn of the century they started to discover 
the problems associated with that strategy. The most important one was that, 
as the Central European economies became more integrated in the EU 
economy, wages slowly started to rise alongside productivity. While trade 
unions appear careful (or too weak) to negotiate inflationary wage settlements 
in most V4 countries, real wages in the export sector in the V4 have 
nonetheless increased substantially over the last decade. Another, related, 
issue was that companies began to face skill bottlenecks as the result of two 
mutually reinforcing processes. As more foreign companies took advantage of 
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the beneficial labour market conditions in CEE, and often a large part of the 
relevant age groups sought employment outside their country of origin, the 
number of available workers fell rapidly. Second, companies lacked 
adequately qualified labour due to the complete (Poland) or partial (Slovakia, 
Czech Republic) dismantling of vocational and technical training systems that 
had been established before 1989. Finally, the remnants of vocational and 
technical training have been simply inadequate for the industrialization 
trajectory that the V4 have adopted, since they were organized along the 
traditional Soviet-era industrial lines emphasizing the skills for heavy-basic 
instead of complex industries.  
The effect of these different pressures has been that the level of specific skills 
in younger age cohorts, and particularly those of the type that such fast-
growing high-value added export sectors require, has fallen rapidly. A similar 
development took place in the relations with suppliers: a large multinational 
firm in an assembly-based industry such as automobiles and consumer goods 
is ultimately only as good as its suppliers – of which there were few 
indigenous ones left after 1989. For a while firms avoided these types of 
bottlenecks by importing the necessary parts form the West, but relatively 
high transportation costs made such a strategy at best a temporary stop gap. 
Thus large firms were forced to negotiate with their suppliers how they 
would settle in CEE or arrange for domestic firms to upgrade their operations 
and become suppliers. 
The potential solutions to these bottlenecks – resolving the skills shortage and 
technical upgrading of suppliers – led to well-known collective action 
problems. The problem takes its paradigmatic form in the area of skills: if 
company A sets up an in-house training programme to alleviate the skill 
shortages it experiences, then company B has a strong incentive not to do the 
same and instead poach the workers trained by A – which leaves A, in an 
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open labour market (i.e. assuming that skills are to a large degree transferable 
within industry and workers free to change jobs), with only two options: 
either abandon training (lest the company subsidizes training among its 
competitors) or cooperate with B. The first option, which leads to a low-skill 
equilibrium, is far from optimal (though not unheard of, as Finegold & 
Soskice 1988 analyze for the UK); the result is that A abandons the training 
system and thus gradually ceases production as skills dry up. But the 
medium to long-term investment horizon of the newly established companies 
in CEE makes that a very unfavourable move: unless A is willing to divest 
after only a few years and thus incur significantly negative returns on its 
investment, A is forced to stay in the market. The alternative option – 
cooperation – is therefore a considerably more attractive one, but this one 
runs into the standard problem that in the absence of binding sanctions 
neither A nor B will contribute to the public good that skills have de facto 
become. The stalemate that ensues as a result of this failure to provide public 
goods is, other things being equal, impossible to overcome without a third 
party enforcing cooperation, a role usually played by the state or private 
associations in most OECD countries. Yet governments have been reluctant to 
play such a dirigiste role in the labour market of most CEE economies, and 
the few attempts to build non-state associational governance mechanisms to 
handle these types of collective action problems (by making membership of 
Industry Chambers compulsory, for example) were abandoned quickly in 
most of the places where they were tried.  
As a result of the fast growth in production volume in the region, labour force 
growth was significantly below the needs of the many multinational 
companies locating in the central region of the V4, even when correcting for 
productivity growth. Being large operations, car plants often rapidly depleted 
the available skilled workforce (a fortiori when they all located in the same 
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area with a relatively tight labour market to begin with), and they faced the 
skills bottleneck earlier than companies in other industries would. The 
solution to this hard constraint has been that car assembly plants, especially 
Volkswagen (VW), one of the earliest western investors in the region, have 
started recruiting workers from a slightly wider area and train them 
themselves. But other companies have also increasingly located in the region, 
usually as a result of the positive network externalities associated with being 
a second-mover: they benefit from the policies and institutions that the first 
mover and local governments have put in place without having to invest in 
them. In Slovakia, for example, VW has been recruiting and training workers 
from 50-60 km away and bussing them into the Bratislava area. When 
Peugeot (PSA) opened a car plant in the area of Trnava a few years later, most 
of the workers quite reasonably preferred to work close to home over the 
daily trip to Bratislava. VW thus not only implicitly trained workers for PSA 
but also failed to resolve the key problem at the basis of the reinstatement of 
firm-level training, since it lost its trained workers to PSA.  
This dilemma was resolved through the construction of a complex network of 
non-market private actors that offered VW a chance to negotiate cooperation 
directly with PSA. VW used its close relations with the local German 
Chamber of Commerce to start conversations with the French Chamber first – 
thus opening indirect communication with PSA – and other Chambers, 
especially the Slovak and the American Chambers, afterwards. Once 
agreement on cooperation had been reached between the main companies, 
these Chambers then set out to organize a de facto industry-wide training 
system with them – and acted as enforcers, less by stick than by carrot – using 
their local political clout to induce the local and national governments to fill in 
the institutional and policy holes (such as the provision of basic general 
industry skills and skill certification).  
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As the circumstances have forced major multinational firms to react to the 
issue, the process has seen an evolution from worker poaching in the case of 
PSA Trnava and VW Bratislava to different forms of coordination. Companies 
did not turn to existing institutions and organizations (which were largely 
absent anyway) but started building voluntarist forms of private network 
arrangements. These networks take different forms, but they usually seem to 
involve local Chambers of Commerce of the FDI-sending and of the FDI-
receiving countries, local and regional authorities, and central support from 
public actors such as the Ministries of Labour, Education or Economic Affairs. 
The role of the Chambers of Commerce is perhaps the most surprising: since 
many of the companies were large firms (often of German origin), who were 
privileged partners of the local (German) Chamber, they used this 
institutional vehicle to build links with other companies, not directly but 
through the different Chambers, asking them to provide a cooperative 
framework that increased and secured contributions by individual companies 
to the collective good. These proto-institutional frameworks built around the 
Chambers and the large foreign investors became the building blocks for local 
forms of coordinated problem-solving in which collective goods – club goods, 
in fact, but often with spill-overs into the rest of the local economies – were 
produced and access to them was regulated through these governance 
networks.  
Coordination can therefore be constructed de novo, but this process mirrors 
the collective action dynamics associated with industrial upgrading in other 
CMEs such as Germany and Japan. Inter-firm coordination, at least of the 
type that extends beyond immediate ad hoc solutions, emerges when a third 
party has the ability to enforce (at least in the limiting case) compliance with 
the arrangement that produces the public good. To a large extent 
international Chambers of Commerce (ICCs, meaning national chambers of 
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commerce in a foreign country) can rely on carrots for this soft form of 
enforcement: since the MNCs depend on them for many important but often 
intangible services and local representation, they will also look favourably 
upon requests by ICCs to help resolve a wider problem. But there appears to 
be more to this than simple goodwill. ICCs actually play a crucial role in 
informal dispute settlement through mediation between MNCs and local 
suppliers: contract enforcement through courts may take several years, is 
unpredictable, and therefore costly – something, in short, that MNCs would 
prefer to avoid (Pistor 1996 offers an early analysis of this for Russia). ICCs 
offer mediation services that allow the problem to be resolved quickly, and 
the vast majority of disputes in fact seems to pass through the ICCs’ 
mediation and arbitration services rather than through local courts (some 
informal estimates suggest up to 98%, but this is likely to be less in developed 
capitalist economies with a long-standing tradition of commercial law courts 
and more in relatively young capitalist economies of the sort that we find in 
Central Europe). This club good is the sanctioning capacity that supports the 
carrot when ICCs try to negotiate a collective solution to training bottlenecks.  
 
5. Conclusion 
By the mid-2000s, embryonic forms of strategic coordination between 
multinational companies were emerging in Central-Eastern Europe, one of the 
places where such informal collective arrangements would ex ante seem 
highly unlikely. MNCs located there for very opportunistic, possibly even 
relatively short-sighted cost-related reasons, governments and non-market 
actors appeared too weak to push for such forms of business coordination and 
inter-firm cooperation, and constructing this type of coordination is, even in 
the best of cases, considerably more difficult – possibly impossible – than 
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destroying it. This outcome was, somewhat ironically, linked to the nature of 
FDI in the region itself. Greskovits (2005) has drawn our attention to what he 
calls ‘thorough versus shallow’ paths of industrialization. The crucial 
operational difference between these two models of industrialization can, in 
more analytical language, be captured in the time horizons that foreign 
investors face. In the case of ‘shallow’ industrialization, the part of investment 
made up by fixed costs is small, and capital is, as a result, highly mobile; in 
the case of ‘thorough’ restructuring, the part of fixed costs is high, capital is 
therefore considerably less mobile, and the structural asymmetry vis-à-vis 
labour and suppliers is substantially mitigated: problems that occur simply 
have to be resolved, and that often includes negotiations with workers and 
their representatives in industries such as the automotive industry, and with 
suppliers and regional authorities. In short, high set-up costs limit exit options 
of multinational companies; as a result they cannot simply leave when faced 
with bottlenecks, but have to weigh the costs of divesting against the costs 
associated with resolving the problems that the bottlenecks produce. When 
production profiles become more asset-specific, as they seem to have done in 
the last decade in the region and especially in the industry examined above, 
both the costs incurred as a result of problems associated with bottlenecks 
and the relative costs of divesting rise steeply. 
This particular arrangement, which ties capital locally after an initial 
investment, is at the basis of the emerging modes of inter-firm coordination in 
Central Europe that are documented in this paper. If the relative advantages 
of problem-solving outweigh other considerations, companies are, all other 
things being equal (which they can be taken to be in this particular case) 
prone to engage in problem-solving. However, in the absence of existing local 
or national policies and institutions that provide a blueprint or at least a 
policy matrix that companies can draw on, they are forced to solve problems 
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on their own. The issue then is that the solution to a problem that one 
company is trying to resolve is likely to produce positive externalities for 
other companies – in effect, the solution has the key characteristics of a 
collective good: it is non-rival and excludability is low. Under those 
conditions, as we know since Olson, the good is not produced or 
consumption of the good is subject to selective incentive mechanisms. Because 
of the small number of actors, the second is highly possible – but hard to 
build in the absence of external sanctioning institutions. This is where 
coordination across firms comes in. If a small number of firms can be 
persuaded that cooperation to produce a good is both in the individual and 
the collective interest, they are likely to contribute. However, for that to 
happen, some deliberative and sanctioning mechanism has to be in place that 
allows them to agree on a joint initiative in the absence of a strong state that 
would offer this and enforce cooperation. The international Chambers of 
Commerce, whose reputation allows them to nudge MNCs into cooperation 
and whose exclusive provision of a club good that is crucial for the MNCs 
gives that nudge some bite, provides this mechanism.  
Strategic coordination between large firms is therefore, and somewhat 
surprisingly, possible without a battery of historical conditions present, even 
in the low-trust circumstances of mid-2000s Central Europe, a setting in which 
it is by all accounts highly unlikely to emerge. However, the historical 
hypothesis correctly suggests that strategic coordination can be a highly 
asymmetric process. While building coordination requires a complex set of 
conditions, destroying it can be relatively simple, with small changes in the 
environment jeopardizing this fragile process, and thus undermining its 
sustainability. Identifying some of the necessary conditions for strategic 
coordination to emerge without a supporting history therefore begs the 
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question how such benign processes can be sustained in the absence of 
historical frameworks conducive to sustainability.  
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